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Summary 
Grattan Institute’s 2013 report, Balancing budgets: tough choices 
we need, concluded that without structural reforms Australian 
Governments could face a decade of deficits. Subsequent events 
suggest this may have been optimistic.  
The Commonwealth Government has run deficits for six years, 
largely due to a rapid increase in net spending on older 
households. The costs of repaying these deficits will fall primarily 
on younger households. 
The next ten years are likely to be even more difficult. Falling 
terms of trade and lower nominal economic growth will drag on 
revenues at the same time the Commonwealth Government 
intends to fund substantial new policy initiatives.  
The Commonwealth Government is yet to respond to the scale of 
its budget challenges. In office, both major political parties have 
hoped that bracket creep and favourable economic conditions 
would deliver a surplus. Hope is the key word: over the last six 
years, outcomes have consistently been worse than these 
projections. The latest short- and medium-term projections rely on 
optimistic assumptions about organic revenue growth and 
spending restraint. If any of them fail to materialise, the burden on 
younger generations will increase.  
The biggest worry is that budget projections assume that growth 
will return to “trend”. The International Monetary Fund recently 
joined a growing group of economists who believe that long-run 
economic growth in developed countries was trending lower even 
before the financial crisis, and future expectations should be lower 
again. 
State budgets are also under pressure. Spending in health and 
education and other vital areas is growing faster than GDP. 
States’ revenues are threatened because the Commonwealth has 
alleviated some of its own budget pressures by substantially 
reducing promised transfers to state governments for hospitals 
and schools. Recent state government budgets provide no insight 
into how they will respond to the looming funding gap.  
Hoping for the best is not a budget management strategy: it 
simply shifts the costs and risk of budget repair onto future 
generations. More active policy measures to achieve budget 
repair are required. While containing spending will be important, 
both the politics of budget repair and the sheer size of the budget 
gap mean that governments will not be able to restore budgets to 
balance without also boosting revenues. 
In a series of papers over the next two months, the Grattan 
Institute will set out four priority reforms for repairing 
Commonwealth and state government revenues. Our proposed 
policies – reducing superannuation tax concessions, changing 
capital gains tax and negative gearing, broadening the GST, and 
introducing a broad-based property levy – would all materially 
increase government revenue with limited collateral damage to 
the economy and the most vulnerable in our society.  
These changes are politically difficult, particularly as governments 
do not have the money to “buy” reform. But if they are serious 
about tackling the looming budget gap governments will need to 
tackle some of them. Sustainable budgets depend on tough 
choices, not hope. Making these choices will be vital so that future 
generations do not have to foot the bill for today’s inaction.  
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1 Why do deficits matter?
If current policy settings persist, both Commonwealth and state 
governments are likely to post significant deficits for many years.  
Deficits force future generations to pay for the spending of current 
generations. Our report for Grattan in 2014, The Wealth of 
Generations, showed that each $40 billion dollar deficit would 
increase the lifetime tax burden for households headed by a 
person aged 25 to 34 today by $10,000.1 So the deficits run by 
the Commonwealth over the last five years represent a future tax 
burden of $50,000 for an average young household. More years 
of deficits by Commonwealth and state governments will magnify 
this burden.  
Deficits can be justified if they fund productive spending that will 
increase future economic growth. Yet recent deficits have largely 
funded growth in net spending on older households, particularly 
through health services, welfare payments and tax cuts for 
retirees.2 While much of this increased spending is valuable, it is 
unfair to ask future generations to pay for it.  
Addressing the structural concerns with the budget sooner rather 
than later is important for the future welfare of today’s young 
Australians. But as the median voting age nudges 50,3 there is 
likely to be strong resistance to policies that reduce entitlements 
for older Australians. Yet older Australians undoubtedly care 
about the welfare of the next generation. Older voters may be 
                                            
1 Daley, et al. (2014), p. 9. 
2 Ibid. 
3 In the 2013 election, just over 47 per cent of voters were 50 and over at the 
Close of Rolls on 27 August 2013. See: AEC (2013). 
persuaded that change is necessary if the dividend for younger 
Australians is clear.  
There are also good economic reasons to repair the budget 
position. Governments can use deficit funding to smooth 
economic activity over the business cycle, as the Rudd 
Government did in 2009. Yet this requires governments to deliver 
surpluses when growth has recovered. Sustained budget deficits 
incur interest payments and limit future borrowings, reducing the 
capacity of governments to respond to adverse economic shocks. 
The Australian economy is particularly exposed because, with 
interest rates at historical lows, the Reserve Bank can do little 
more to stimulate the economy, and so the Commonwealth 
budget will be the primary defence in an economic downturn.  
Both main parties espouse a medium-term fiscal objective of a 
balanced budget over the economic cycle. But ten years is a long 
cycle. There are real concerns that the can is being continually 
kicked down the road, justified by the claim that in the absence of 
perfect economic conditions, it is “not yet” the time for fiscal 
repair. 
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2 A decade of Commonwealth deficits  
In five of the last six years, the Commonwealth Government has 
posted headline deficits of more than 2 per cent of GDP. 
Assuming revenue and spending projections are correct, Australia 
is on track for more than a decade of deficits between 2008 and 
2019, with Commonwealth net debt projected to peak at 18 per 
cent of GDP in 2017,4 higher than any year since the mid-1990s.5 
These deficits may have helped to maintain economic activity and 
minimise unemployment while economic growth was relatively 
slow. However, structural deficits are less defensible.  
Budget balances will always follow a cycle – surpluses tend to 
occur when economic growth is strong, boosting tax receipts and 
reducing welfare spending. High prices for our exports relative to 
our imports – the terms of trade – can also boost tax receipts and 
make a favourable budget position more likely. The structural 
budget balance is the underlying budget balance after allowing for 
these fluctuations in the business cycle and the terms of trade.6  
As well as a headline deficit, the Commonwealth Government 
also had a structural budget deficit of more than 2 per cent of 
GDP for the past five years (Figure 1). The drag of slower global 
economic conditions was generally outweighed by the temporary 
boost to revenues from the mining boom.  
                                            
4 Treasury (2015), p. 3-9. 
5 Net debt was 18.1 per cent of GDP in 1995-96. See: Treasury (2014b), p. 273.  
6 Daley, et al. (2014) 
Figure 1: The Commonwealth Government budget will deliver a 
decade of deficits 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Notes: Cash balance is equal to receipts minus payments, minus Future Fund income 
(under 0.25 per cent of GDP). Stimulus is treated as a cyclical impact; changes in company 
tax from the decade average due to depreciation are treated as a cyclical impact. The 
depreciation rate is assumed to be 15 per cent. Terms of trade baseline is 2002-03. 
Source: Minifie et al. (2013); Grattan analysis  
Both higher spending and lower revenue caused these headline 
and structural deficits. Commonwealth revenues fell sharply 
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billion a year over three years, and reindexing the fuel excise in 
line with inflation will raise $1 billion in 2017-18. But at the same 
time, the Government cut off revenue streams by abolishing the 
carbon and mining taxes. These were forecast to raise $2.9 billion 
and $1.1 billion respectively in 2014-15.7  
Figure 2: Commonwealth revenues fell while expenditures 
remained high  
Commonwealth revenue and expenditure as percentage of nominal GDP 
 
Note: Revenues and expenses from the general government sector operating statement of 
the Commonwealth Government financial statements. Difference between revenue and 
spending is the net operating balance. Commonwealth “own purpose” revenues and 
expenses (i.e. excluding revenues from the GST, and excluding grants to the states) follow 
a similar pattern. 
Source: Treasury (2015); Grattan analysis.  
                                            
7 PEFO (2013), p. 55. 
Instead, most of the revenue increase over the last four years, 
and the increase projected over the next four years, results from 
existing taxes growing faster than GDP. Fiscal drag – growth in 
income tax collections as a share of wages – accounts for most of 
the planned improvement in the budget position (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Fiscal drag is doing most of budget repair work  
Change in budget position from 2014-15 to 2018-19, $ billion 
 
Notes: Budget balance is the underlying cash balance from the 2014-15 budget. Estimates 
of the contribution of spending and revenue (including personal income tax) growth are 
based on the differences between the 2018-19 forecasts of these variables and the value if 
they had grown at the same rate as nominal GDP from 2014-15. Personal income tax 
includes income and other withholding taxes, superannuation fund taxes and fringe 
benefits. Initial growth in deficit at nominal GDP shows impact on budget balance if 
spending and revenue had continued to grow at nominal GDP. Other is a balancing item 
and includes effects of parameters changes.  
Source: Treasury (2015); Grattan analysis.  
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When fiscal drag is not returned through periodic personal income 
tax cuts then average tax rates for most taxpayers increase. 
Growth in nominal wages results in taxpayers paying their top 
marginal tax rate on a great proportion of their income. This is 
exacerbated for taxpayers pushed into higher tax brackets.  
Middle-income earners are particularly hurt. Figure 4 shows that 
on the wages growth projected in the 2015-16 budget, the 
average tax rates for people in middle-income groups will 
increase by between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points. For example, 
a person in the sixth income decile, earning $50,000 a year, will 
go from paying an average tax rate of 17.1 per cent in 2015 to 
19.1 per cent in 2019. Such higher marginal tax rates can 
significantly affect incentives to participate in the workforce, 
particularly for women with children in childcare.8 
On the spending side, the Commonwealth’s stimulus package 
increased spending during the GFC. That was meant to be a one-
off boost to the economy, yet since then spending has been 
maintained at these higher levels. Social security and welfare 
spending contributed about a third of the growth in spending over 
the decade. Growing Age Pension payments are the biggest 
contributor, but health, education and general public services, all 
of which grew faster than GDP,9 also increased significantly.  
In contrast, over the next four years outlays are forecast to grow 
slower than GDP. But explicit policy measures only explain some 
of this slower spending growth. Spending measures introduced in 
the Government’s 2014-15 Budget were projected to save $14.2 
billion in 2017-18.10 Of these, $5.9 billion have been passed, $5.8 
                                            
8 Productivity Commission (2015), pp.11-12; Daley, et al. (2012), pp. 42-23. 
9 PBO (2013), pp. 7-8; Daley, et al. (2014), pp. 20-23. 
10 Treasury (2015), BP No. 2, p. 47. 
billion are stalled in the Senate (but are included in the budget 
projections)11 and a further $2.5 billion have been abandoned.12 
The Government has booked another $2.3 billion in savings in the 
2015-16 Budget. If all the measures passed, they would only 
restrain spending growth by about 0.8 per cent a year.  Even on 
these forecasts, spending will remain a larger share of the 
economy than at any point between 2003 and 2008 (Figure 2). 
Figure 4: Bracket creep will increase average tax rates most for 
middle income earners   
Percentage point increase in average tax rates 2015 to 2019 
 
Source: Treasury (2015); ATO (2015); Grattan analysis. 
                                            
11 PBO (2015c) 
12 Grattan estimates based on major measures that have been reversed 
including proposal to index social security benefits to CPI, Medicare co-
payments and the 6 month waiting period for Newstart Allowance.  
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3 Future pressures on Commonwealth budgets  
Commonwealth Government revenues will struggle over the next 
decade if the terms of trade continue to fall and if economic 
growth remains sluggish. At the same time, the budget will need 
to make room to fund significant new spending initiatives.  
3.1 Slowing income growth and tax revenues  
Australian government revenues are strongly linked to the 
performance of the economy and the terms of trade. When 
national incomes are growing strongly, personal and corporate 
income tax receipts increase. About two thirds of Commonwealth 
Government revenues come from these volatile direct taxes.13 
The projected slower growth in Australian living standards over 
the next decade is therefore a problem for Commonwealth 
revenue.14 
In the 2000s, record terms of trade led to incomes rising quickly.15 
But falling terms of trade are expected to drag on future income 
growth. Minerals prices are falling as past mining investments 
increase supply.16 Australia’s terms of trade are forecast to fall by 
9 per cent next year, and then stabilise.17   
                                            
13 Grattan analysis of Treasury (2014a), BP No.1, p. 5-18. 
14 Treasury (2010), p. vii. 
15 Carmody (2013). National living standards are often measured by reference to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures the volume of goods and 
services produced in the Australian economy. Gross National Income (GNI) 
measures the income earned by Australian residents. GNI differs from GDP 
principally because GNI captures changes in the price of exports compared to 
the price of imports. In periods when there are large changes in the terms of 
trade, GNI is arguably a more accurate reflection of living standards. 
16 Stevens (2013); Minifie, et al. (2013) 
17 Treasury (2015), p. 2-5. 
Other projections suggest a longer and deeper fall in the terms of 
trade.18 The drag on per capita incomes will be material – about 
0.5 percentage points over the next decade, when the terms of 
trade return to long-run levels (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Terms of trade added to income growth in the 2000s, but 
will drag in the next decade 
Average annual percentage point contribution to gross national income 
per person 
 
Note: Assumes labour productivity for 2025-2055 is at historical average of 1.5 per cent. 
Source: Hockey (2015a), p. 33. 
                                            
18 Treasury (2014a) 
-1
0
1
2
3
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000 to
2013
2014 to
2025
2025 to
2055
Terms of 
trade 
Net foreign 
income 
Labour 
utilisation
Labour 
productivity
GNI per person 
Projections
Fiscal challenges for Australia  
Grattan Institute 2015 8 
Labour force participation over the next few decades will also 
transition from boosting growth to dragging on growth as the baby 
boomer generation reaches retirement age. Treasury estimates 
that the labour force participation rate for people aged 15 years 
and over will fall from 64.6 per cent in 2014-15 to less than 62.4 
per cent by 2054-55, as a smaller proportion of the population will 
be of traditional working age.19 The annual impact is estimated to 
reduce national income growth by 0.1 percentage points, 
compared to the boost of 0.2 percentage points from rising 
participation over the past 40 years (Figure 5).20  
Labour productivity may also fall. A decline in the number of 
mining construction employees will reduce average labour 
productivity because other industries generate much less value 
per hour worked.21 This effect is likely to outweigh the ‘productivity 
dividend’ from past investments in the mining industry beginning 
production.22 
Over the longer-term, technological change is the main driver of 
higher labour productivity. But some economists warn that 
technology will not improve living standards as dramatically as it 
has done in the past.23 Therefore national incomes and individual 
living standards are likely to grow less quickly. Terms of trade are 
falling; participation is likely to be flat to decreasing; and there is 
more risk that labour productivity growth will be lower, rather than 
higher, than its long term average (Figure 5). As a result, 
Commonwealth revenues will be under pressure. Treasury has 
                                            
19 Hockey (2015a), p. ix. 
20 Ibid., p. xi. 
21 Borland (2014)  
22 Productivity Commission (2014), p. 12. 
23 Gordon (2012); Cowen (2011). See Daley et al (2014) and Dolamore (2015) 
for a more detailed discussion of this literature.  
warned that Australia is highly unlikely to achieve the real rate of 
growth required to return the budget to surplus by relying on 
economic growth alone.24  
3.2 Spending demands are not going away  
The Commonwealth budget will also face increasing pressures on 
spending from population ageing25 and from new policy initiatives 
such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), the 
Families Package, and the Direct Action policy to address climate 
change, and commitments to increase defence spending. 
Together these signature polices are likely to add more than 1 per 
cent of GDP to spending over the decade.26 Funding for these 
commitments will need to come through some combination of 
increases in revenues or cuts to spending in other areas.  
The NDIS in particular will be a significant cost to the budget 
within the decade. The Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) 
forecasts that spending on the scheme will rise to $32 billion in 
2025-26.27 
3.3 Projections may understate the problems 
Short and medium term projections of the Commonwealth budget 
position, although far from rosy, may understate the challenge of 
budget repair. They embody optimistic assumptions about 
                                            
24 Parkinson (2014) 
25 Hockey (2015a) 
26 Grattan estimates based on the forecast spending on the NDIS (PBO (2014)) 
and the forecast growth in childcare and defence spending above the growth in 
nominal GDP (National Commission of Audit (2014)). This does not include the 
cost of the Direct Action Policy because no spending estimates are available 
beyond the forward estimates.  
27 PBO (2015a), p. 5. 
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revenue and spending growth. Individually, any one of the 
assumptions may be defensible. Collectively, they seem unlikely. 
The history of the last six years is not encouraging: budget 
outcomes have consistently been much worse than the original 
projection four years earlier. 
3.3.1 Revenue projections 
Treasury’s projections of revenue and expenses over the four 
years of the forward estimates rely on income taxes rising from 11 
per cent of GDP in 2014-15 to 12.1 per cent in 2018-19.  
Figure 6: Personal income tax is projected to grow more strongly 
than the last decade  
Annual growth in personal income tax revenues, historical and forecast  
 
Source: ATO (2015); Treasury (2015). 
The increase primarily reflects fiscal drag from rising nominal 
wages but also assumes a rapid recovery of capital gains tax 
receipts from 0.6 to 0.9 per cent of GDP. On these projections, 
personal income tax will grow faster than the historical average for 
each of the next four years (Figure 6).  
This may be plausible if there are no changes to income tax rates 
and thresholds. But as average income tax burdens increase, the 
government is likely to face strong pressure to return some of the 
fiscal drag by changing the tax scales. In most years in the 2000s, 
governments reduced tax rates or increased tax thresholds (or 
both), limiting the effects of bracket creep.   
Other revenue projections also seem optimistic. The 2015-16 
budget projects that the terms of trade will fall by 9 per cent in 
2015-16 and then stabilise at a level about 50 per cent higher 
than their long-run average (Figure 7). However, terms of trade 
shocks around the world in the last few decades have typically 
been symmetrical. In other words, the terms of trade have tended 
to revert to their long-run average.28  
The budget also projects healthy economic growth of 3.25 per 
cent in 2016-17 and 3.5 per cent after that – including non-mining 
investment growth of 7.5 per cent in 2016-17.29 In contrast, ABS 
and Reserve Bank survey data suggest non-mining investment 
could remain subdued for some time.30  
                                            
28 Minifie, et al. (2013), pp. 34-35. 
29 Treasury (2015), pp. 1-7 and 2-5. 
30 RBA (2015), pp. 38-44. 
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Figure 7: Terms of trade are projected to stabilise above their long-
term average 
Terms of trade, 2013-14 = 100 
 
Source: Eslake (2015)  
These revenue projections are underpinned by an overarching 
assumption that by the end of the two-year estimates period the 
economy will return to the medium- to long-term growth rate.31 
The assumption begs the question of what long-term growth rate 
is appropriate. Since the global financial crisis economic growth 
has been much slower in developed countries. In the 20 years 
leading up to the GFC (1988-2007), real GDP grew by an average 
                                            
31 Treasury (2014c). More precisely, the projections assume that economic 
activity increases to close the output gap, so if growth has been below trend, 
then economic growth is projected to be higher than the long run average. 
of 2.8 per cent a year across the OECD. Since 2010, the average 
growth rate has been 1.6 per cent.32 The IMF has warned that 
potential output growth rates in advanced economies are likely to 
remain below pre-GFC rates for at least the next five years 
because of the negative effects of demographics and the slow 
recovery in business investment.33 On this basis, it suggested 
Australia should expect slower growth for several years.34 
The longer-term prognosis is not yet clear:35 it may just be a 
sluggish recovery, typical for a finance-induced recession, that will 
ultimately pass,36 although the global increase in debt levels may 
foreshadow a lot more adjustment to come. Or it may reflect 
gloomy predictions that economic growth in coming decades will 
be slower than for the last few decades.37 
Whatever lies ahead, the overall Commonwealth budget 
projections seem optimistic and unlikely to be realised. A PBO 
report concluded that the risks to the budget from economic 
shocks are weighted to the downside. It identified a real risk that 
labour productivity growth and the terms of trade will be less 
favourable than projected, significantly reducing tax collections.38 
Company tax receipts could also well be lower than forecast given 
slower business capital expenditure39 and losses carried forward 
from the GFC. 
                                            
32 Grattan analysis of OECD (2015). 
33 IMF (2015b), chapter 3. 
34 IMF (2015a). 
35 Baily and Bosworth (2013) 
36 Roxburgh, et al. (2011) 
37 See above, footnote 23. 
38 PBO (2014) 
39 RBA (2015), pp. 38-44. 
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3.3.2 Spending projections 
The Commonwealth’s spending projections also seem optimistic. 
They assume tight spending restraint, with government spending 
falling as a share of the economy (Figure 2).40 Annual spending 
growth of 2.6 per cent is projected between 2014-15 and 2025-26, 
considerably below the average of 3.6 per cent over the previous 
decade.41 Consistent with this spending restraint, the 
Commonwealth Government forecasts that spending will decline 
to 24.2 per cent of GDP in 2024-25, below its long term average.42  
Spending is forecast to be below the historical average in all 
program areas other than defence, as is shown in Figure 8, which 
compares the projected growth in the Commonwealth’s largest 
spending programs over the next 10 years with the history of the 
last 10 years.  
Some of these estimates seem improbable. For example, it 
seems unlikely that spending on demand-driven programs such 
as the Medicare Benefits Schedule will moderate without 
significant policy changes. The PBO attributes the strong 
historical growth in Medicare payments to policies (such as the 
Bulk Billing Incentive and the Extended Medicate Safety Net) that 
have made Medicare services more attractive or accessible. New 
policy measures such as the freeze in Medicare scheduled fees 
are forecast to produce lower growth. Yet for more than 20 years 
the ageing of the population, medical science and technology 
improvements and rising expectations of the health system have 
put relentless pressure on the health budget.43 These pressures 
will not abate, and the forecasts almost certainly understate them. 
                                            
40 Treasury (2015), p. 5-11. 
41 PBO (2015a), p. 5. 
42 Treasury (2015), BP No. 1, p. 3-9. 
43 Daley, et al. (2014) 
Figure 8: Spending forecasts rely on lower growth in almost all 
major programme areas  
Real annual spending growth, per cent 
 
Note: The defence estimates do not factor in the commitment to increase defence 
spending to 2 per cent of GDP by 2023-24. Rather they are based on the long‐term funding 
commitments made in previous Defence White Papers and government announcements.  
Source: PBO (2014) 
The decline in spending growth for hospitals and schools may 
be credible given the decision in the 2014-15 Budget to limit 
spending increases to inflation and population growth. This of 
course does not mean that spending growth will decline in these 
program areas – merely that the states will have to bear all of the 
cost of real per capita growth (section 1.5).  
The 2015-16 budget assumes even tighter spending growth than 
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driven by the NDIS, no category is expected to grow materially 
faster than inflation.44  
In other programs, lower forecast growth rates are tied to 
measures from the 2014-15 and 2015-16 Budgets that are 
unlikely to be passed by the Senate. Therefore spending on the 
Carers Payment, Higher education and Newstart benefits is 
likely to be more than forecast (section 1.1). Even the forecast 
growth in defence spending – the only program area where 
spending is forecast to grow faster than in the last decade – does 
not put Australia on a path to spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence 
by 2023-24 as the Government has promised.45 
Spending projections also assume there will be no new spending 
initiatives promised at elections or in response to natural disasters 
or community demands for more assistance to the disadvantaged. 
Experience over the last decade suggests that such spending 
restraint will be difficult (Box 1). 
Given the number of things that need to go right, moderating 
spending growth to 24.2 per cent of GDP in 2024-25 seems 
extremely unlikely without further explicit budget measures to cut 
expenditure. 
3.3.3 Experience of budget forecasts and outcomes 
The government’s fiscal strategy relies heavily on these optimistic 
projections. The measures introduced in this year’s budget will 
make no net improvement to the budget position in 2018-19 
(Figure 3). The government justifies its inaction by saying that the 
projections suggest it is on a “clear and credible path back to 
                                            
44 Treasury (2015), BP No. 1, p. 5-11. 
45 See: Defence (2014), p. 1. 
surplus.”46 But projections over the past five years have 
consistently overestimated the position of the budget four years 
out (Figure 9).  
Box 1: Electoral sweeteners: a recent history 
Governments of both persuasions like to promise to lift welfare 
payments, cut taxes and improve government services, especially 
in election years.   
In the last decade, Age Pension recipients have been the greatest 
beneficiaries of discretionary top ups. Increases in pension 
payments over and above the normal indexation arrangements 
were made in 2007 in the Simpler Superannuation changes, in the 
2008-09 and 2009-10 Budgets, and in late 2011 as part of the 
carbon pricing compensation package.   
Recipients of Family Tax Benefit Part B, the Disability Support 
Pension, Carer Income Support and childcare payments also 
received one or more discretionary increases  
In 2009-10 higher education received a significant funding boost 
for teaching and research and reforms to the student income 
support system. In primary health, funding was boosted by the 
Bulk Billing Incentive and Extended Medicare Safety Net in 2004, 
by increasing GP benefits payments in 2005 and by the inclusion 
of dental services in 2007.  
Source: PBO (2014); Commonwealth Budget Papers 2002-03 to 2012-13. 
                                            
46 Hockey (2015b) 
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Figure 9: Budget forecasts have persistently missed the mark  
Commonwealth budget balance, actual and forecast, per cent of GDP 
 
Source: Commonwealth Budget papers 2009-10 to 2015-16. 
Figure 10 shows why. In the years leading up to the global 
financial crisis, forecasters underestimated the budget position by 
failing to anticipate the large spending and tax bonuses delivered 
in response to the crisis. These spending and revenue policy 
measures generated cumulative forecast errors in excess of six 
per cent of GDP for 2009.  They were offset by higher revenues 
due to the unexpected increases in mining prices from 2006-2009. 
Figure 10: Budget outcomes have disappointed due to spending 
decisions and revenue shocks   
Cumulative change over 4 years to budget balance projection 
Per cent of nominal GDP  
 
Notes: The change for each year 2009 to 2015 is the cumulative change over four years 
from the initial projection to the final outcome. The change for 2016 to 2018 is the 
cumulative change from the initial projection to the latest estimate. The change is 
expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP in the outcome year.  
Sources: Commonwealth Budget Papers, Mid-year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 
statements, Pre-Election Economic Outlook and Economic Statements (various years). 
But just as the earlier estimates failed to foresee the surge in 
revenue in the years leading up to the GFC, later estimates have 
failed to capture its decline. For the last two years, declines in 
revenue parameter estimates, particularly the terms of trade, have 
reduced budget balances from the original projections by more 
than 3 per cent of GDP. Policy decisions have not helped – new 
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spending policies were not always matched by new revenue 
measures so budget positions deteriorated further from the 
projections in most years.  
The scale of these errors – larger than the ultimate deficit in most 
years – calls into question a do-nothing budget strategy that 
justifies deficits on the basis of a projected surplus or near surplus 
at the end of the forward estimates period.  
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4 State government budgets also face growing pressures  
In contrast to the Commonwealth, state government operating 
revenues have generally exceeded expenses over the last 
decade (Figure 11). Yet states spent more over the last six years 
than over the previous six. State revenues and spending are both 
forecast to fall over the forward estimates.  
Figure 11: State government budgets have been largely in balance 
Per cent of nominal GDP  
 
Notes: The 2014-15 Budget Papers for many state governments were released prior to the 
Commonwealth Government budget so forecasts do not include the full impact of reduced 
Commonwealth funding for health previously agreed under the National Health Reform 
Agreement. This equates to around $1.2 billion in revenue (0.06% of GDP) in 2017-18.  
Source: Treasury (2014b); ABS (2014b) Table 1; Grattan analysis.  
These aggregates obscure variations between states. Tasmania 
and South Australia ran operating deficits after property market 
turnover declined and stamp duty revenues fell in 2010-11. Their 
budget positions have since improved. In Queensland, deficits 
were larger when revenues were hit by the 2011 floods, but the 
return to surplus was faster. The NSW, Victoria and Western 
Australia Government operating budgets were largely balanced 
over the period. More recently, Western Australia went into deficit 
when royalty revenues from iron ore fell sharply. This was 
exacerbated by the fall in their share of GST revenues as the 
Grants Commission process redistributed record state mining 
royalty revenues from previous years which had already been 
spent by the WA Government. 
Unlike the Commonwealth, the states also have significant capital 
spending that does not immediately affect net operating 
balances.47 Capital spending increased substantially after 2005, 
and far exceeded the offsetting depreciation of previous capital 
spending. State governments funded this increased infrastructure 
spending largely through borrowing, and so net debt increased 
(Figure 12). In the decade to 2013-14, higher interest and 
depreciation costs increased subsequent operating budget 
expenses from six to more than nine per cent of state revenues.48  
                                            
47 The depreciation on this capital spending affects net operating balances in 
subsequent budget years. Non-cash depreciation already built into state 
operating budgets will erode this debt if state capital spending falls, as their most 
recent budgets forecast.   
48 Daley, et al. (2014), p. 41. 
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Figure 12: State and territory net debt has increased rapidly 
Total state and territory net operating balances and debt, 2014$ billion
 
Notes: Debt forecasts in NSW, Queensland, South Australia and ACT were revised 
downwards between the 2013-14 Budget and the 2014-15 Budgets and Mid-Year 
forecasts. This accounts for the lower combined debt forecasts compared to those 
presented in our 2014 Budget Pressures report (Daley, McGannon, et al. (2014), 
p. 41).The improvement in the forecast debt position was particularly significant in NSW 
because of the sale of Macquarie Generation in September 2014. 
Source: State government Budget Papers and Mid-Year forecasts. 
4.1 Future pressures on state government budgets  
All state governments will face more significant budget pressures 
beyond the forward estimates. Health and education spending are 
forecast to grow strongly over the next decade. At the same time, 
the Commonwealth has stated that from 2017-18 it will no longer 
contribute to growth in real spending per person in these areas. 
Health and education make up almost half of state government 
expenditure. If spending per person continues to grow faster than 
inflation, then it is unlikely that other areas can be cut enough to 
make up the gap. Instead, state governments will need additional 
revenues to keep their budgets balanced. 
4.2 More spending on hospitals, schools and 
infrastructure 
Growing healthcare costs are the most significant spending 
pressure on state governments. Spending on health, primarily 
hospitals, is about 25 per cent of state recurrent expenditure.49  
State government health spending grew considerably faster than 
the economy over the last two decades. Increased use of services 
rather than population ageing was the main cause of health 
spending growth (Figure 13).50 As the economy grew, 
governments spent more of their income providing more and 
better health treatments, including those using new 
technologies.51  
This strong non-demographic growth is forecast to continue.52 
Population ageing will also contribute more to spending growth as 
the large baby boomer cohort reaches the age brackets when 
health spending per person is much higher.53  
 
 
                                            
49 Ibid., Supporting Analysis, p. 4. 
50 Daley, et al. (2014), p. 26. 
51 Gruen and Thomson (2007) 
52 PC (2013) 
53 Daley, et al. (2014), p. 26. 
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State government spending on schools is also forecast to rise 
faster than GDP in years to come. The increase is partly a result 
of commitments to increase funding for schools with 
disadvantaged students between 2014 and 2019 under the 
National Education Reform Agreement.54  
Figure 13: All age groups contributed to increased health spending 
Increase in real government health spending, 1989 to 2010, billions 
 
Note: Less reliance ought to be placed on figures for 80+, as sample sizes are small and 
data categories change across surveys. Spending figures are adjusted to constant prices 
using the GDP implicit price deflator. Since health prices grew somewhat faster than 
average price levels, a small proportion of the increase across all categories will reflect this 
faster price growth.  
Source:  ABS (Various years); ABS (2014a) Table 59; Grattan analysis.  
                                            
54 National Education Reform Agreement  
State governments spent more on infrastructure – particularly in 
transport – over the last decade (Figure 14).55 Much of it was 
effectively unfunded. Although state spending on infrastructure is 
now falling, there will be significant pressure to maintain or 
increase spending on infrastructure to cope with increasing 
population and concerns about congestion.56 
Figure 14: Government spending on infrastructure rose from 2007, 
but is now falling 
Engineering construction work done for the public sector, % of GDP  
 
Notes: By financial year. Exclude telecommunications, insignificant after Telstra sale. 
Source: ABS (2015) 
                                            
55 These estimates based on engineering work done are consistent with ABS 
statistics based on government budget papers PBO (2015b), p. 41. 
56 Kelly and Donegan (2015), pp. 112-128; Infrastructure Australia (2015). 
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Higher infrastructure spending can be justified if it generates 
increases in the productive capacity of the economy sufficient to 
justify the cost. But Australian governments could do a lot better in 
their project choices. An overhaul of project selection processes – 
including greater reliance on independent and transparent cost-
benefit analysis – would significantly improve the returns to this 
spending.57 
4.3 The Commonwealth has substantially reduced planned 
funding for the states  
Under Commonwealth policy adopted in the May 2015 budget, 
state governments will have to fund all increases in real spending 
per person for hospital and schools.58 The change abandoned 
previous Commonwealth undertakings, set out in the COAG 
National Education Reform Agreement and the National Health 
Reform Agreement, to contribute to real increases in spending per 
person. 
The shift in spending responsibility back to the states is very 
significant. The Commonwealth estimates that by 2024-25 the 
changed policy will reduce its real spending by $11 billion on 
hospitals and $5 billion on schools.59 By 2054-55, the reduction in 
real spending for hospitals could be as large as $78 billion (Figure 
15).60  
If the forecast growth in spending on these services occurs, then 
state government budgets will need to cut other services or 
increase revenues by a substantial amount.  
                                            
57 Productivity Commission (2013) 
58 Treasury (2014a), BP No.2, p. 126. 
59 Estimates in 2013-14 dollars. Schools estimate calculated from nominal value 
of transfer provided in ibid., Overview, p. 7. Health estimates based on Hockey 
(2015a) (see: Figure 15). 
60 Treasury (2014a), Overview, p. 7. 
Figure 15: Commonwealth will provide much less funding to the 
states for health than previously agreed  
Forecast Commonwealth health funding withdrawn from states,  
2014$ billion 
 
Notes: Estimates of health funding withdrawn from states based on the difference in 
Australian Government spending under the ‘proposed policy’ and ‘previous policy’ 
scenarios modelled in the 2015 Intergenerational Report. 
Source: Hockey (2015a), Tables 2.10 and C.2; Grattan analysis. 
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4.4 Other State revenues are also under pressure 
State revenues may also come under renewed pressure. 
Relatively constant revenues over the last decade may have 
masked increased vulnerabilities in individual revenue sources. 
In particular, untied revenues from the GST fell over the decade, 
from almost 4.0 per cent to 3.2 per cent of GDP in the decade to 
2013-14. The main causes were people saving more and 
spending more on untaxed goods and services, particularly rent 
and mortgage payments.61 Unless these trends reverse, GST is 
unlikely to increase as a percentage of GDP. 
Conveyance stamp duties also fell. They averaged about 1.2 per 
cent of GDP between 2002-03 and 2007-08, but only 0.9 per cent 
of GDP since then.62 
These falls over the decade were offset by rises in royalties and 
small increases in property and payroll taxes. Yet state royalties 
are now falling as price falls outweigh volume increases.63 All 
states effectively benefited from the rise in royalties, and will feel 
the pinch if they fall. Revenue redistribution determined by the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission and implemented through the 
carve up of the GST means that changes in one state’s royalties 
are effectively shared among all states. 
                                            
61 Daley, et al. (2014), p. 34. 
62 PBO (2015b) 
63 State royalties are typically value-based; they are not simply charges based on 
volume. 
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5 What should governments do? 
Australian governments are running substantial budget deficits. 
Future pressures are likely to make the problems worse. A drift 
back to surplus is unlikely, and relies on best case assumptions 
that have often disappointed in the past.  
There have been a range of justifications for inaction. 
Governments have taken advantage of the wriggle room provided 
by the vagueness of where Australia is in the economic cycle. For 
several years they have played St Augustine: “let us be chaste 
and run a surplus – but not yet.” And while they have pointed to 
sluggish economic growth to justify deficits, they have glossed 
over the temporary boost to revenues from the mining boom. 
Finally, they have talked up their position by pointing to surpluses 
or near surpluses towards the end of each budget’s forward 
estimates. These surpluses have continued to recede to the 
horizon as optimistic projections have run aground on reality. 
To bring their budgets back to balance, governments will need to 
undertake reforms on both the revenue and the spending side. 
But recently the Commonwealth Government’s energy has been 
focussed on cuts to spending. There have been large reductions 
in the budget for foreign aid64 and sizeable savings have also 
been proposed (and in some cases reversed) for higher 
education, primary care, and welfare through changes in eligibility 
thresholds and indexation arrangement for benefits.65 The 
                                            
64 The 2014-15 Budget cut proposed spending for official development 
assistance (ODA) by $7.6 billion over five years (Treasury (2014a), p.121). 
Another $3.7 billion in savings over four years was announced in MYEFO 2014-
15 (Treasury (2014b), p. 47). 
65 Treasury (2014a), Budget Paper No. 2, pp. 77; 133; 197-204; 210. 
Commonwealth Government has deferred any significant changes 
in its revenue mix until after its Tax White Paper.66 
Most state governments have also shown a lack of enthusiasm for 
new revenue measures.67 These governments, after benefiting 
from high mining royalty revenues, have offered no plan to fill the 
gap as these volatile revenues wane.  
But there are revenue measures that could make a meaningful 
contribution to budget repair with little collateral damage. In a 
series of forthcoming papers, we set out four policy proposals – 
reducing superannuation tax concessions, changes to capital 
gains tax and negative gearing, broadening the GST and the 
introduction of a broad-based property levy – that we think 
governments should adopt to improve their fiscal position. 
These reforms will be politically difficult. To build the public case, 
governments should adopt budget projection methodologies that 
provide a more realistic picture of the pressures on Australia’s 
medium term budget outcomes. These will make it more obvious  
that we cannot rely on the hope that our luck will improve. 
Tougher decisions are needed.
                                            
66  Loughnane (2013) 
67 Very few state governments have engaged in serious debate about tax reform 
in recent years. Indeed, the trend in election campaigns has been to rule out any 
changes to taxation. In the recent Victorian election campaign, the Labor 
Opposition committed to no new taxes or tax increases if they won power 
(Savage (2014)). The LNP made similar commitments in the Queensland 
Election campaign (Eaton (2015)). One exception is South Australia that has 
recently released a comprehensive discussion paper on State Tax Reform 
(Government of South Australia (2015)). 
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